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INTRODUCTION 
Shortly after the end of the Second World War, the United States faced the task of having to determine 
how to respond to foreign governments that did not aggressively seek to curtail the actions of communists 
within their states. This problem was not endemic to any one region, but it had a distinct significance in 
Latin America. The US government became convinced that the “the domination or control of the political 
institutions of any American State by the international communist movement . . . would constitute a threat 
to the sovereignty and political independence of American States."1
Guatemala and Bolivia were among the first two Latin American countries to force Washington to 
address this problem. In the early part of the 1950s both countries were governed by leaders who seemed 
willing to permit the active participation of communists in their respective domestic systems. Moreover, both 
countries initiated a variety of radical economic and social reforms, many of which were in tune with 
policies implemented by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and had been demanded by 
the local, national communist party. Despite these similarities, the US was of two minds in its assessment of 
the nature of the problems posed by Guatemala and Bolivia. 
Shortly after Dwight D. Eisenhower became president of the United States. Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles noted that international communism had been probing for nesting places in the Americas, 
and that "[i]t finally chose Guatemala as a spot which it could turn into an official base from which to breed 
subversion which would extend to other American Republics."2 The administration concluded that 
Guatemala had become a communist center because its president '"had appointed communists to several 
strategic government positions, permitted an increase in the volume of government propaganda, supported 
labor leaders with communist affiliations, and conducted a foreign policy parallel to that of the Soviet 
Union."3 Bolivia's president, on the other hand, though initially tolerant of the communists, was believed to 
have finally recognized "the fundamental rivalry between [his party] and the communists, and ha[d] 
gradually adopted a more anti-Communist attitude. [He] ha[d] also recognized that close association with 
the communists would diminish [his] chances of getting US aid."4
Having defined the problems posed by Bolivia and Guatemala differently. Washington, justifiably, 
came up with different solutions. On 6 July 1953, the Department of State announced that the United States, 
in an attempt to help Bolivia overcome its economic woes, would sign a "one-year contract for the purchase 
of tin concentrates (at world market prices). ... double its technological assistance program, and . . . consider 
additional measures to assist Bolivia in the long-range solution of its problems."5 Less than a year later, on 18 
June 1954. President Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to launch a covert paramilitary 
operation designed to topple the Guatemalan government. Nine days after the operation had been authorized, 
Guatemala's president, Jacobo Arbenz, resigned. He was succeeded ten days later by the leader of the covert 
operation. Carlos Castillo Armas.6
What persuaded the Eisenhower administration that, although the governments of Bolivia and 
Guatemala had initiated similar domestic policies and had for some time worked closely with the 
communists, their actions justified different responses? In order to explain Washington's presumed 
inconsistency one must account for the Eisenhower administration's reliance on analogies to define and 
respond to international problems and for the manner in which the targeted states responded to such 
analogies. More specifically, the Eisenhower administration was initially convinced that communists in the 
two Latin American countries were relying on the same strategy their counterparts had employed in China in 
the 1930s to gain power. However, the US took different actions toward the two countries because Bolivia's 
leaders understood the significance of this analogy and sought to persuade Washington that Bolivia would 
not become a "second China," while Guatemala's leaders did not grasp the significance of the China analogy 
and as a result did not try to convince Washington that they were committed to preventing the rise of 
communism in their country. 
THE ROLE OF ANALOGIES IN THE FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES 
The assumption that political leaders could be viewed as rational international actors gained 
momentum shortly after the end of the Second World War. Decision makers comprising the official, 
bureaucratic manifestation of the state were assumed to act as a body with a single mind, capable of 
formulating foreign policies based on rational calculations of the effect such policies would have on the 
state's power. As noted by Hans Morgenthau, to give meaning to the raw material of foreign policy, i.e., 
power, political reality had to be approached with a rational outline.7
In the late 1960s and throughout the larger part of the 1970s, the study of foreign policy experienced a 
critical metamorphosis. It was pointed out that rational choice requires the gathering of vast amounts of 
information, the generation of all possible alternatives, the assessment of the probabilities of all 
consequences of each alternative, and the evaluation of each set of consequences for all relevant goals. A 
new generation of scholars recognized that fulfillment of these requirements were beyond the reach of 
most foreign policy makers or, for that matter, of most human beings. As Herbert Simon noted, these 
requirements are "powers of prescience and capacities for computation resembling those we usually attribute 
to God."8 In addition, it was realized that because on a typical day foreign policy makers address a wide array 
of international problems, they allot different amounts of time to different problems, depending on their 
significance and, as a result, examine some problems more carefully than others. 
During this period, another group of scholars proposed that rationality is impeded not only by the 
absence of extraordinary intellectual powers and by the shortness of time, but also by the decision maker's 
own beliefs and cognitive conditions. Borrowing from theories of cognitive consistency, analysts 
maintained that when a human processes and interprets information, that person is not just attempting to 
understand a problem and formulate a solution; he/she is also trying to ensure that as he/she conducts such 
tasks his/her beliefs and cognitions about an object or concept and any external beliefs and cognitions about 
the same object or concept remain consistent.9 When the external beliefs and cognitions about an object or 
concept do not contradict those of the decision maker, the relationship remains stable. If a contradiction exists 
and leads to a conflict, then the decision maker must decide whether to alter his/her perspective. This decision 
is in large measure a function of the intensity of personal beliefs. The greater the intensity of those beliefs 
the greater the likelihood that the decision maker will not modify his/her position. 
Another cognitive theory that has been widely used by students of foreign policy-making is schema 
theory. Schema theory suggests that the decision maker attempts to shorten and simplify the decision-making 
process. The need for short cuts may stem from sheer laziness, lack of time, or even shortage of information. 
Schema theory's driving assumption is that decision makers reason analogically.10 Analogies are schemas, or 
cognitive scripts, stored in memories in the form of structured events that tell familiar stories. Cognitive 
scripts are either episodic or categorical. The foreign policy maker infers an episodic script by analyzing a 
single experience defined by a sequence of events. An example of an episodic script is the "Yenan Way" 
script. The script, designed by foreign policy makers in the Truman administration, was used to contend 
that the radical agrarian reforms instituted in China in the 1930s were the prelude to communist domination 
in that country. A categorical script is a generalization of an episodic script. In the above example, the 
''Yenan Way" script was used to justify the generalization that radical agrarian reforms were a preamble to 
communist regimes. A categorical script need not be the result of several past experiences: one impressive 
incident can spur a decision maker to transform an episodic script into a categorical form." The decision of 
which script to store in memory and use is a function of the foreign policy maker's beliefs and values. A 
foreign policy maker commits to memory only those scripts that are politically, socially, economically, or 
morally important to him/her. This means not only that the choice of scripts is subjective, but also that the 
content of the scripts stored from any one experience can differ from one individual to another. 
Analysts have argued that a foreign policy maker uses the same cognitive script to address similar 
problems until he/she encounters a situation in which the employment of the same script results in costly 
consequences. This study agrees with the postulate, but adds an important qualifier. According to Theodore 
M. Newcomb, a decision maker's willingness to accept information or an analysis from a second party is to a 
large extent a function of whether the source is considered suitable. If the source is believed to be reliable, 
one of two outcomes can ensue. When the decision maker and the source agree, their relationship is termed 
"positively balanced." Under this condition, the decision maker does not need to modify his/her stand. When 
the decision maker disagrees with the source, the relationship is termed "positively imbalanced." Under this 
condition the decision maker is forced into a trade-off situation. He or she either has to sacrifice his/her own 
perspective and accept that of the source or vice versa.12 Based on Newcomb's argument, this study intends to 
propose that a foreign policy maker need not always experience costly consequences to abandon a cognitive 
script. He/she is bound to make a similar decision if apprised of the script's inapplicability by a trusted 
advisor or a reputable decision maker. 
THE GENESIS OF TWO CHALLENGES 
Eisenhower moved into the White House in early 1953, convinced that communism posed the greatest 
threat to international stability and that the United States had a moral obligation to use military, political and 
economic means to contain it. "It is the rooted conviction of the present administration," he noted, "that the 
Kremlin intends to dominate and control the entire world."13 Any attempt on the part of the United States 
"to sit at home and ignore the rest of the world." in the face of such a threat would lead to one consequence: 
"destruction."14 This attitude colored Eisenhower's perception of Latin America. After lamenting during a 
National Security Council meeting that the United States, due to its commitment to "raising standards of all 
peoples," was inhibited from assigning "whatever proportion of national income" it so desired to warlike 
purposes, the new president emphasized that in the case of Latin America his administration would have to 
design policies to "secure the allegiance of these republics to our camp in the cold war." Similar views were 
conveyed not long after by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who noted that "the Communists are 
trying to extend their form of despotism in the hemisphere" and that the challenge would be to convince 
Latin Americans that communism was "an international conspiracy, not an indigenous movement:'1"' Of 
great concern to Dulles was Guatemala. "For several years international communism has been probing here 
and there for nesting places in the Americas. It finally chose Guatemala as a spot which it could turn into an 
official base from which to breed subversion which would extend to other American Republics."16
Eisenhower and Dulles were not the first US leaders to be troubled by developments in Guatemala. As 
the Second World War moved to a close, Washington was forced to turn its eyes toward Guatemala. In 
1944, after being ruled for nearly thirteen years by Jorge Ubico, Guatemalans forced him to resign and 
elected Jose Arevalo as their new president. 
On 15 March 1945, at his inaugural speech, Arevalo announced that it was his intention to free 
Guatemala from Washington's control. His new program, coined "spiritual socialism." was predicated on 
the assumption that government had to create the conditions that would facilitate the individual's 
psychological development and moral liberation. The program disavowed both Marxism and individualistic 
capitalism. According to Arevalo, by viewing the individual as an economic animal and by prescribing class 
struggle, Marxism undermined the individual's spiritual foundation. In turn, individualistic capitalism, with 
its emphasis on the individual over collective interests, weakened the structure of society.17
Washington took Arevalo's ascent to power seriously. Upon evaluating Guatemala's new constitution, 
the State Department concluded that it was free of communist dogma. The State Department later wrote 
that: "Like other recent constitutions in Latin America and elsewhere, the Guatemala charter heavily 
emphasized the responsibility of the state with respect to economic and social matters and asserted its 
concern for the welfare of the underprivileged. It formulated ambitious economic goals; it spelled out 
extensive social reforms; it called for a more equitable distribution of the national income. It specifically 
provided the basis for the emergence of a protected labor force and for land reform legislation."18
To be free of communist dogma, however, did not signify that the Guatemalan government was free of 
communist influence. Of great concern to Washington were the policies the Arevalo administration had began 
to implement, and whether such policies might be the result of communist influence. In 1945, the Arevalo 
government expressed its support of the Caribbean Legion, a radical Latin American organization 
committed to ousting dictatorships, by force if necessary. Between 1946 and 1947, the new Guatemalan 
government instituted social security and Labor Code laws that threatened United Fruit's investments in the 
country. 
These developments persuaded Washington that it needed a representative in Guatemala who would 
speak bluntly about US concerns and interests. In 1948, President Truman appointed Richard Patterson, an 
individual well-known for his anti-communist sentiment and recent work in Yugoslavia, US ambassador to 
Guatemala. Patterson did not waste any time in expressing his country's discontent with the policies of the 
Arevalo government. At a dinner hosted in his honor in January 1949, he warned the Guatemalan president 
that his job as ambassador was to promote US interests in Guatemala and that the relations between both 
countries would suffer if the host country did not stop persecuting those interests. A year later, Ambassador 
Patterson went so far as to demand that Arevalo dismiss seventeen government officials, all of whom were 
denounced as being communists. 
By 1950, the Truman administration had concluded that the communists in Guatemala were taking 
advantage of the country's free processes and institutions to expand their own power and to destroy freedom. 
Washington, however, was still unwilling to take a major stand against the Arevalo government. The 
Truman administration caved in when the Arevalo government demanded that Patterson be removed from his 
post following his demand that Guatemalan officials be dismissed. This action did not reflect an absence of 
commitment on the part of the Truman administration to stop the growth of communism in Guatemala. 
Instead, it reflected the hope by some State Department officials that Guatemala, under the leadership of a 
newly elected president, would be more responsive to US concerns. 
Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was sworn in as Guatemala's new president in March 1951. Perceptions 
about Arbenz prior to his inauguration varied. Edward Miller, the assistant secretary of state for inter-
American affairs, and Milton Wells, the first secretary at the US Embassy in Guatemala, believed that 
Arbenz, because of his military background, would change Guatemala's pro-Soviet course and veer toward 
the center. State Department official Tapley Bennett and Ambassador Patterson, on the other hand, were 
convinced that the Soviet Union had approved Arbenz's candidacy, that all communist-controlled 
organizations in Guatemala supported him, and that the new president was committed to following a 
communist policy. 
These differences became inconsequential by the middle of 1952. Thomas Mann, who as deputy 
secretary of state for inter-American affairs had led the US delegation to Arbenz's presidential inauguration, 
returned from the trip convinced that the Soviets had finally succeeded in placing a communist in power.19 His 
argument was bolstered by the Guatemala Labor Court's January 1952 order that the American-owned United 
Fruit Company re-hire 4,500 Guatemalan employees who had been laid off for three years and pay them 
$650,000 in back wages, and by the fact that five months later the Arbenz administration instituted an 
agrarian reform bill that called for the division and redistribution of idle land exceeding 223 acres, 
including land owned by foreign corporations.20
Impressed by Thomas Mann's argument and convinced that the radical reforms implemented in 
Guatemala substantiated Mann's analysis, Truman briefly considered launching a covert paramilitary invasion 
to overthrow Arbenz. On the advice of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, however, Truman decided against 
such a measure for fear that an invasion would undermine the reputation of the United States in Latin 
America.21 Truman also did not believe that the plan could be completed and implemented before the end of 
his term. These concerns were anticipated by Arbenz, who in September 1952 paid a visit to the US 
ambassador to Guatemala. Rudolf C. Schoenfeld, and asked whether the United States regarded the 
Guatemalan government as communist. Schoenfeld responded that the US government "saw Communists 
holding key positions in various agencies and institutions and many evidences of Communist activity . . . 
[and] that this denoted a serious degree of Communist infiltration in the country and a tolerance for it. . ."'— 
Schoenfeld later noted that Arbenz had been interested and attentive at their meeting, but that "he gave no 
hint that he planned to take any action" to limit the activities of the communists.23
A few months after Truman had aborted the covert paramilitary plan, a new administration arrived in 
Washington. The Eisenhower administration's first action toward Guatemala occurred mid-1953, when the 
Department of State submitted a formal complaint to the Arbenz regime concerning the nationalization of 
property owned by the United Fruit Company. Subsequently, the president ordered the Department of State 
to draw a plan designed to control Soviet expansion in Central America. According to the plan, the United 
States would form a coalition with the nations surrounding Guatemala for the purpose of mounting political 
and economic pressure on its government, forcing Arbenz either to resign or to expel the communists.24 The 
coalition would also protect surrounding nations from communist infiltration from Guatemala. 
Determined to gain a better perspective on the communist threat in Latin America, President Eisenhower 
asked his brother Milton to visit the region. Upon his return in July 1953, the president's brother reported that 
Guatemala had "succumbed to communist infiltration.”25 Milton Eisenhower's report, substantiated by the 
continued redistribution of land owned by the United Fruit Company, motivated Eisenhower to order the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to prepare a plan designed to covertly overthrow the Guatemalan 
government.26
For the next year, Washington kept to a minimum its interaction with the Arbenz government. Aware 
that relations were not good between Guatemala and Washington, the Arbenz regime sought to persuade the 
US representatives that "the Communist issue [was] a false one fabricated by the United Fruit Company”'27 
In February 1954, the Guatemalan president proposed the appointment of a neutral commission to arbitrate 
Guatemala's dispute with the company. Washington rejected the offer, and when two months later the 
Arbenz administration offered United Fruit SI. 185.000 in compensation, the US government countered with 
a demand for $15.854,849.28 At about this time, the Arbenz government intercepted a letter from a Castillo 
Armas, a Guatemalan national, to Anastasio Somoza, Nicaragua's ruler, stating that Washington had finally 
decided to overthrow the Guatemalan government.29 In hopes of protecting his regime from this threat. 
Arbenz asked the United States to lift its arms embargo on Guatemala.311 Washington refused, and pressured 
its European allies not to accept any requests for arms by Guatemala. With nowhere else to go, Arbenz 
turned to the Soviet bloc. 
Arbenz's decision unwittingly afforded the United States a major point of leverage. In mid-May 1954, 
2.000 tons of Czechoslovakian arms arrived in Guatemala. After learning about the arrival of the weapons, 
Eisenhower authorized the CIA to put into action its plan to overthrow the Arbenz government. Aware that 
his presidency was in jeopardy, Arbenz requested a meeting with Eisenhower. The US Ambassador to 
Guatemala, John Peurifoy, whose principal task was to help coordinate the paramilitary attack on the Arbenz 
government, declined the meeting and emphasized that the United States was not concerned about the fate of 
the United Fruit Company but of communism in Guatemala. Peurifoy's remarks were upheld by Secretary 
of State Dulles on 8 and 10 June when he emphasized that even if the United Fruit matter were settled, the 
presence of communism in Guatemala would still remain a problem.31 On 18 June 1954. Castillo Armas and 
a small number of paramilitary forces, financed and trained by the CIA, entered Guatemala. Upon realizing 
that Guatemala's armed forces would not defend his government, Arbenz resigned. 
Guatemala was not the only Latin American country that forced Washington to carry out major policy 
changes. Less than a year before General Eisenhower assumed the presidency, the Movimiento National 
Revolucionario (MNR), became Bolivia's new ruling party. The ascension to power of the MNR was not 
well received in Washington. The Truman administration, fearing that the MNR would not respect 
international agreements and private property and would open the doors to communism, waited seven weeks 
before granting the new Bolivian government formal diplomatic recognition. And yet, about a year after the 
MNR had assumed power, the Eisenhower administration announced that the United States would buy 
Bolivian tin ores at the world market price (at the time of delivery) for one year, would double the amount of 
technical assistance to Bolivia, and would assist Bolivia to resolve some of its other economic problems.32 These 
steps reflected a dramatic change in Washington's behavior toward the MNR. The MNR was formed in 1941, 
six years after the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay had come to an end. The Chaco War, one which 
Bolivia was supposed to win, but did not, "provided the stimulus which eventually would give rise to a new 
political order in Bolivia."33 On the eve of the Chaco War. Bolivia was a highly stratified and under-
developed state. Although its mining industry had grown considerably and there had been some increase in 
urbanization, most of the population still depended on traditional subsistence agricultural crops. In fact, even 
when compared with the experiences of the people in other Latin American countries, the majority of 
Bolivians "lived a harsh and brutal life."34
Dissatisfied with the structure of the Bolivian political, economic and social system, and convinced that 
their senior military officers were incapable of leading, a coalition of junior officers, led by Colonel David 
Toro and Lieutenant Colonel German Busch, launched a bloodless coup in May 1936. Shortly after 
assuming power. Colonel Toro announced that the new military government had no intention of implanting 
caudillismo. Its objective, he added, was "to implant state socialism with the aid of the parties of the left."33 
One of the initial steps taken by the regime was to establish for the first time a minister of labor. This action 
was followed almost immediately by the expropriation of the petroleum concessions controlled by the 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and by the establishment of the State Socialist Party, which was to act 
as the political expression of the new regime. 
The Toro regime was overthrown in July 1937, by Lieutenant Colonel Busch. The new Bolivian 
leader immediately began to implement policies more radical than those approved by his predecessor. He 
established the country's first labor code, nationalized both the Central Bank and the Mining Bank, and 
issued a decree requiring that all mining companies sell all the foreign exchange they earned by selling their 
products abroad to the Central Bank.36 The decree was supported by the vast majority, but opposed by the 
major mining companies. 
In August 1939, Busch, who had been ruling the country as a dictator for nearly five months, committed 
suicide. He was immediately replaced by General Carlos Quintanilla, whose first act was to cancel the 
decree pertaining the sale of foreign exchange. Quintanilla, and his successor, General Enrique Penaranda, 
sought to put a stop to the economic changes that had been ensuing since the end of the Chaco War, but 
their attempts were unsuccessful. 
Probably the strongest reminder that the clock could no longer be turned back was the formation of 
new: political parties committed to challenging the status quo. These parties covered the entire ideological 
spectrum. At the far right stood the Falange Socialista Boliviano, a party made up of intellectuals with some 
contacts among military officers and patterned after the Spanish Falange party. At the far left stood two 
parties, the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR) and the Partido de Izquierda Revolucionario (PIR). The 
POR had Trotskyist inclinations, while the PIR represented the Stalinist trend. The most important party to 
appear during this period, however, was the MNR.37 The MKR, which counted among its founders Victor Paz 
Estenssoro, the head of the Mining Bank under the Busch regime, agreed with the PIR and POR on at least 
two issues. It acknowledged the need to nationalize some of Bolivia's major means of production and 
support the nascent labor movement. Its uniqueness, at least during the early stages, was reflected by its 
position regarding the Indian problem and international affairs. In the 1940s, Bolivian Indians were still 
experiencing discrimination. Both the POR and PIR demanded an end to this unjust treatment, but the MNR, 
possibly due to its middle-class origin, did not voice its preference. On matters of international affairs, the 
MNR had no qualms about expressing its opinion. Although it contained a variety of factions from former 
Nazis to Marxists, during the early stages of the Second World War it expressed a pro-fascist position. This 
stand was at odds with the PIR which vigorously argued that it was in Bolivia's national interest to support 
the Allied cause.38
These new parties remained in the background during the early years of the 1940s. President 
Penaranda succeeded at hindering the drive for change until late 1942, largely because his supporters 
controlled the Bolivian Congress. During this period he also managed to assure Washington that it would 
continue to have access to Bolivian tin as the United States became more entangled in the new world war. 
Bolivia's domestic and international panorama began to change in late 1942. In December of that year, 
miners struck against the Catavi mine. During one of the demonstrations, troops opened fire killing a 
substantial number of participants and wounding others. The MNR used the incident to strengthen its 
relations with the miners. At the same time, fearful that the incident could lead to further disruptions, thus 
undermining Bolivia's ability to maximize its production of tin, the US government dispatched a mission to 
look into labor conditions at the tin mines. Members of the mission submitted a report recommending that the 
Bolivian government improve the working conditions at the mining camps.39
The Penaranda regime managed to remain in power for one more year. It was finally ousted in 
December 1943, by a group of young military officers and the MNR. The United States took very little time 
to express its opposition to the new government. Washington feared that Argentina, which had just had its 
own military coup six months earlier and had openly expressed its pro-Axis stand might have helped instigate 
the Bolivian overthrow.40 Furthermore, the US government did not trust the MNR. Washington's uneasiness 
originated in 1940, when Britain, in an attempt to induce support from the United States and Latin America 
against Germany, fabricated a letter to both the United States and Bolivia stating that a Nazi "putsch" was 
developing in Bolivia. Upon the arrival of the letter, the Bolivian government expelled Germany's minister, 
declared a state of siege, and arrested several political leaders, including members of the MNR. In turn, the 
US drew a link between the MNR and Nazi-Fascism. It did not try to suppress the MNR leaders or label 
them Nazi, but because of the party's earlier and continuing opposition to the Standard Oil settlement and 
the government's action, it "thereafter associated them with Nazi-Fascism.”41
This perception had a major effect on Washington's actions following the 1943 coup. Upon assuming 
power, the new Bolivian president, Major Gualberto Villarroel, appointed three members of the MNR to his 
cabinet. US Secretary of State Cordell Hull, convinced that the hemisphere was "under sinister and 
subversive attack by the Axis, assisted by some elements within the hemisphere itself," ordered the 
Department of State to warn Bolivian officials that the United Stated would not recognize their new 
government unless the three MNR members were removed from the cabinet.  Villarroel acceded, and the 
United States recognized his government in June 1944.42
Recognition of the new government did not foster better relations between the two countries. From the 
moment Villarroel assumed power to the day he was assassinated in July 1946, the United States intervened 
in Bolivia's domestic affairs by taking positions which coincided with those of the owners of the tin mines 
and against the Bolivian government. The Villarroel government, cognizant that its battles with the tin mine 
owners were being undermined by the United States, repeatedly pleaded with Washington to behave 
impartially, but to no avail.43
With Villarroel dead and a government friendly to the tin mine owners in power, the US government 
assumed that Bolivia might finally become a country responsive to the interests of the United States. As noted 
by US Ambassador to Bolivia Joseph Flack in a telegram to Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs Spruille Braden: "A popular revolution in every sense of the word has just occurred in Bolivia . . . 
this may prove first democratic government in Bolivian history. Immediate prospects are greatly improved 
relations with the United States . . .”44   Flack's prediction proved to be erroneous. 
Although the new Bolivian government managed to remain in power until 1951, it did not placate 
domestic discontent. Bolivia's dependence on foreign markets for the sale of tin, and the fact that tin magnates 
resided abroad and that profits flowed from the country to them, convinced Bolivians that their ills were 
caused by external forces. Thus, when faced in 1951 with chronic economic crises brought about by the 
decrease in the foreign demand for tin. Bolivians vented their anger with the ruling party by electing as 
their new president the leader of the MNR, Victor Paz Estenssoro. However, the military did not accept Paz 
Estenssoro's victory, and on 16 May 1951, it established a new junta under the leadership General Hugo 
Balliavian. The junta announced that it was annulling the elections because the MNR was in league with the 
communists.45 The junta, however, soon realized that it would not be able to placate the masses. On 9 April 
1952, General Antonio Seleme, the head of the Carabineros, extended his support to the MNR. The MNR 
immediately distributed arms to civilians and workers and with the support of the Carabineros marched 
against the military. After three days of fighting the military surrendered, and the MNR asked Paz Estenssoro 
to return from exile to head the new government.46
This development was not well received by American foreign policy makers. They feared that a regime 
that was led by the same individuals who had been tagged as Nazis during the Second World War, that was 
backed by the communists, that was very critical of US foreign policy, and that called for the nationalization 
of the tin mines, could pose a threat to American interests in the region. Washington displayed its concern by 
waiting until 2 June to grant formal diplomatic recognition to the new government. 
Recognition did not intimate that Washington was less apprehensive about Bolivia being governed by 
the MNR. In fact, on 8 September, Secretary of State Dean Acheson sent a telegram to the United States 
embassy in Bolivia advising the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which managed the US strategic 
stockpile of tin, not to sign "long term tin contract so long as uncertainty exists regarding nationalization of 
mines. Department's position has been based on fear that signing long term contract could be considered by 
Bolivian government as green light to confiscatory nationalization and that this would have bad effect in 
other countries where U.S. property rights are at stake."47
This type of response from Washington did not stop the Paz Estenssoro regime from pursuing its own 
political and economic agenda. One of the first steps taken by the new government was to pass an electoral 
law that extended the franchise to the Indian peasantry. Furthermore, in an attempt to reduce the chance of a 
counter military coup, the MNR dissolved the country's armed forces and chose, instead, to depend on the 
support of the Carabineros and the armed militia of the workers and peasant unions.48
The major reforms initiated by the Paz Estenssoro regime, however, were in the economic arena. 
First, in October 1952, it nationalized the tin mines belonging to the three large tin mining companies, Patino, 
Aramayo and Hochschild. The newly nationalized mining industry came under the jurisdiction of the 
Corporacion Minera de Bolivia. Its second economic step was to initiate a major redistribution of the 
country's landholdings. This end was to be accomplished by drafting a new agrarian reform law, organizing 
the peasants and expanding markedly the social services extended to the peasants. On 2 August 1953, 
President Paz Estenssoro signed the new agrarian reform law, which transferred massive amounts of rural 
property from the white or near-white traditional landowners to the Indian peasants. The third step entailed 
the launching of a major economic development program. The program was designed to expand the oil 
industry, create new roads, and open the eastern part of the country.49
The policies initiated by the Paz Estenssoro regime easily could have alienated the United States. To 
begin with, the US seldom welcomed nationalization, particularly of companies that affected directly or 
indirectly its strategic and economic interests. Moreover, Washington was very suspicious of the ideological 
rationale behind agrarian reforms designed to bring about a more equitable and just distribution of property. 
And yet, in 1953, the US, under the leadership of an avowed anti-communist president, not only expressed 
trust in Paz Estenssoro, but believed that his government understood that it would be imprudent to maintain a 
close association with the communists. It was this belief that led President Eisenhower to write President Paz 
Estenssoro on 14 October that the "'friendly spirit of cooperation between our two nations . . . allowed him 
to grant Bolivia with five million dollars in Commodity Credit Corporation stocks of agricultural products to 
satisfy food needs of Bolivia, as well as four million dollars in Mutual Security Aid funds for other essential 
commodities and services . . ."50 
THE RATIONALIZATION OF ANTITHETICAL POLICIES 
The Eisenhower administration's perceptions of the situation in Guatemala were not the result of a 
systematic analysis of communist activities in the country. As Secretary of State Dulles noted on 11 May 
1954, it would be "impossible to produce evidence clearly tying the Guatemalan government to Moscow . . . 
the decision must be a political one based on the deep conviction that such a tie must exist."51 In the early 
1950's, American decision makers were profoundly influenced by their interpretations of developments in 
China prior to and after Mao Zedong's communist party became the country's sole political force. In a book 
titled The Yenan Way published in 1951, Eudocio Racines describes the way the Chinese communists allied 
themselves with middle-class politicians and ambitious army officers and worked themselves into positions 
of power in local communities. The results of these steps, notes Racines, "were the Labor Code, agrarian 
reform, and eventually strict censorship."52
American policy makers soon began to apply Racines' analysis to the situation in Guatemala. 
Raymond G. Leddy, the Department of State officer responsible for Central American and Panamanian 
affairs, testified before the House of Representatives hearing on communist aggression that the "Guatemalan 
Way" represented an improvement over the "Yenan Way" for the communists because it taught them ways to 
deal with the situation in Central America more effectively."13 Leddy's definition of the Guatemalan problem 
was not unique. US Ambassador John Peurifoy, upon his arrival at his new post, warned Guatemala's foreign 
minister that the parallels between the Guatemalan problem and the Chinese problem had portentous 
implications. "Agrarian reform has been instituted in China . . . and . . . today China is a communist 
country."34 A similar argument was made by Secretary of State Dulles during his Senate confirmation 
hearing. "[C]onditions in Latin America are somewhat comparable to conditions as they were in China in the 
mid-thirties when the Communist movement was getting started . . . The time to deal with this rising in 
South America is now."35 But if the best time to deal with the rise of communism in a South American 
country was when the movement was getting started, then what convinced the Eisenhower administration that 
the "Yenan Way" analogy did not apply to Bolivia? 
One of the primary tasks of any foreign policy maker is to give meaning to imprecise information. 
Rarely will a foreign policy maker attempt to carry out this task without the advice of others. In other 
words, who foreign policy makers speak with and listen to have a critical effect on the analogy they rely on 
to define a problem.36 In 1953, the Eisenhower administration was willing to consider soberly the arguments 
forwarded by Bolivian officials but not by Guatemalan officials. Bolivian officials understood that 
Washington would seriously question a Latin American government's stance toward the United States, unless 
this government acknowledged the reality of the communist threat and expressed an absolute commitment 
to its obliteration. Guatemala did not grasp these simple, but pivotal, facts. 
Guatemalan leaders did not ignore Washington's unhappiness. Their mistake was to assume that the 
US was concerned only with protecting the United Fruit Company, and to take lightly its warning that the 
communist threat in Guatemala was real. In September 1952, for instance, during the meeting between then 
US Ambassador Schoenfeld and President Arbenz, the ambassador explained that Americans believed that 
the "'Communists were unduly influential. They saw Communists holding key positions in various agencies 
and institutions and many evidences of Communist activity . . ." Schoenfeld added that, ''President Arbenz 
smilingly assented but expressed doubt as to the accuracy of the estimates in Guatemala ... President Arbenz 
was patently interested and attentive but gave no hint that he planned to take any action."07 Less than a year 
later, but now under the Eisenhower administration, the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs at the 
Department of State wrote: "We have frankly discussed the Communist problem with high officials in 
Washington and in Guatemala. They have brushed aside our views on Communist influence in the country as 
exaggerated. They have described the Communist issue as a false one fabricated by the United Fruit 
Company."58
Probably the most telling example of the inability of the two governments to understand one another 
came during a farewell meeting between Guatemala's Ambassador to the United States, Guillermo Toriello, 
and President Eisenhower. Ambassador Toriello, who was returning to Guatemala to become its new foreign 
minister, tried before departing to convince Eisenhower that Guatemala's problems were the result of United 
Fruit's economic policies and not of communist activities, but to no avail. As Toriello sought to emphasize 
that the "real question was not of communists in the Guatemalan Government, but of the monopolistic 
position of the United Fruit in the country," Eisenhower kept remarking that the United States "couldn't 
cooperate with a Government which openly favored communists."39
In mid-May 1954, the Arbenz regime unwittingly afforded Washington the opportunity to claim that its 
concern regarding the nature of the Guatemalan government was fully justified. The US Embassy in 
Guatemala disclosed the arrival of a ship transporting some 2,000 tons of Czechoslovakian small arms and 
light artillery pieces. The purchase of these weapons had been the direct result of the unwillingness by the 
Eisenhower administration to lift its arms embargo on Guatemala, which had been in place since the early 
1940s. In response to the embargo, and concerned that his military would not be able to withstand a CIA-
backed paramilitary invasion, Arbenz solicited assistance from the Soviet Union.60
Reaction by the Eisenhower administration was swift. Knowing full well that the American Congress 
and public would be outraged if they learned that Guatemala had just purchased weapons from a Soviet ally, 
it reported the transaction to the American media. Congressional leaders called the weapons shipment "part 
of the master plan of World Communism," and asserted that the weapons would be "used to sabotage the 
Panama Canal."61 In turn. Secretary of State Dulles, in a secret cable to various diplomatic offices, noted 
that: "A Soviet thrust into Western Hemisphere by establishing and maintaining Communist-controlled state 
between US and Canal Zone would represent [a] serious setback to [the] free world. It would represent [a] 
challenge to Hemispheric-security and peace as Guatemala has become increasingly instrumental of Soviet 
aggression in this hemisphere.”62
Bolivia did not make Guatemala's mistakes. During the Second World War, the MNR had learned 
painfully that a Bolivian government could not rule without the full backing of the United States. More 
specifically, it learned that although the US was committed to protecting its economic interests in Bolivia, it 
was also willing to reach a balanced compromise so long as Bolivia demonstrated its unbending opposition 
to the Axis powers. The chief problem during the first half of the 1940s had been that President Villarroel 
had not persuaded the Americans that appointing to cabinet posts a few MNR leaders did not indicate that his 
government would side with the Axis powers instead of the Allies.63 For this reason, the US government 
remained convinced until the end of the war that the MNR was anti-Semitic, hostile to the Allies, and well-
disposed toward the Axis powers.64
None of this was forgotten by Paz Estenssoro and his new ambassador to the United States, Victor 
Andrade.65 As Paz Estenssoro assumed the presidency in 1952, he remembered too well that he had been 
forced to resign in 1944 because the US believed that his party, the MNR, was an ally of the Axis powers. 
This time he was determined to ensure that Washington would not view him and his party as puppets of the 
Soviet Union. At his inauguration speech he stated: "[T]his is not an anti-capitalist government precisely 
because of the seriousness of our task, which is in no sense demagogic. We want to ensure progress for the 
majority: we take on this task and assume responsibility for it because Bolivia is extraordinarily rich but it 
needs capital.''66 Paz Estenssoro sought to reinforce the message already conveyed by Hernan Siles Suazo, 
who had been sworn in as provisional president immediately after the MNR and the Carabineros had 
defeated the Bolivian military. In his speech, Siles Suazo emphasized that the new government was 
completely democratic "supported by the great majority of the Bolivian people, with no relations to foreign 
parties, least of all the Communist Party . . .”67
To reduce the likelihood that the United States would misread his government's intentions, Paz 
Estenssoro appointed Victor Andrade as Bolivia's ambassador to the United States. Few foreign diplomats 
understood the US Department of States' thinking and decision-making process as well as Andrade. 
Andrade had served as Bolivia's ambassador to the United States during the Villarroel government. His 
principal task during that period was to convince the US to accept his government's proposal to tax the tin 
mines on production rather than on profits, and to control the percentage of foreign exchange from the tin 
sales the mine owners would be permitted to keep.6R The US government yielded to Andrade's argument, but 
too late. By the time Bolivia and the United States reached an agreement. Villarroel was no longer in power. 
However, Andrade's experience proved valuable. The Bolivian ambassador learned his way in Washington, 
established important contacts, and by the early 1950s was working for the Rockefeller's International Basis 
Economic Corporation in Guayaquil, Ecuador.69
From the moment Andrade was reappointed as Bolivia's ambassador to Washington in 1952, he made 
it clear that for the new MNR government to effectively implement its domestic programs it would have to 
allay Washington's fears. "[T]he panorama which confronted us," he wrote, "could be described in the 
following way: the State Department was mistrustful of a regime which had been accused six years earlier of 
collaboration with German Nazism and which now seemed to have acquired contacts with international 
communism.”70 Andrade also believed that to succeed he would have to help the US leaders understand 
Bolivia's nationalization of the tin mines and land reform program. He emphasized that nationalization of 
the tin mines was something that his government truly regretted but that it had become necessary because 
the "three giants of mining had usurped the nation's right to rule." He then added that his government did not 
"relish the bad reaction which nationalization ha[d] caused in some quarters of the United States . . ." and 
hoped that the "billions of dollars in the United States that [sought] profitable outlets" would go to Bolivia 
where the government was attempting to "create an atmosphere which attracts private capital."71 Regarding 
Bolivia's land reform program. Andrade believed that although "the reform did not directly affect U.S. 
interests, most American leaders were suspicious because they knew nothing of the agrarian system which 
prevailed in Bolivia up to the moment. Under the influence of reactionary propaganda, these leaders were 
inclined to oppose the reform, believing that it violated the democratic principles of the hemisphere."72
Andrade relied extensively on personal diplomacy and on his status as a Washington insider to try to 
bring about a change in attitude towards the new Bolivian government. His status as an insider was 
reflected by the fact that he was one of the very few ambassadors who played golf with Eisenhower from time 
to time at the Burning Tree Golf Club.'3 Andrade's closest Washington ally, however, may have been the 
president's brother, Milton Eisenhower. It was at a family party in Washington that Andrade proposed to 
Milton Eisenhower a visit to Latin America "in order to study at first hand the delicate issues involved in 
[Bolivia's] relations with the United States and the possibilities of mutual cooperation."74
Milton Eisenhower's trip to Latin America proved to be the turning point in US-Bolivian relations. 
His travel reaffirmed the Department of State's belief that the MNR had to be viewed differently.75 More 
importantly, he brought back from Latin America a new perspective.   Upon his return he emphasized that it 
was harmful to tag governments or political parties as communist "in good faith but without essential 
knowledge." He added that the United States should "not confuse each move in Latin America toward 
socialization with Marxism, land reform with Communism, or even anti-yankeeism with pro-Sovietism." 
Regarding the Estenssoro government, he noted that it "may have been inexperienced, sometimes critical of 
us, and more inclined toward socialism than Americans generally prefer . . . But [its leaders] were not 
Communists." He concluded by pointing out that the only way to avert a revolution that would bring the 
communists to power in Bolivia would be to support the rapid social change being advocated by the Paz 
Estenssoro government.76
Milton Eisenhower's message did not fall on deaf ears. Following his trip to Latin America, 
intelligence analysts and foreign policy makers alike argued that the MNR had to be supported in order to 
contain communism in Bolivia. On 2 September 1953, Secretary of State Dulles wrote: 
a situation dangerous to the security of the United States is developing in Bolivia, and urgent action 
is required to meet it. Because of a sharp drop in the price of Bolivia's principal export 
commodity, tin, owing to the imminent cessation of United States tin stockpiling, Bolivia faces 
economic chaos. Apart from humanitarian considerations the United States cannot afford to take 
either of the two risks inherent in such a development: (a) the danger that Bolivia would become 
the focus of Communist infection in South America, and (b) the threat to the United States 
position in the Western Hemisphere which would be posed by the spectacle of United States 
indifference to the fate of another member of the inter-American community.7' 
A month later, President Eisenhower authorized an emergency assistance program that included: $5 million of 
agricultural products from Commodity Credit Corporation Stocks under the Famine Relief Act; $4 million 
from Mutual Security Act funds for other essential commodities; and a doubling of the technical assistance 
program.78 The strategic significance of the emergency assistance program was made more explicit a few 
weeks later by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Moors Cabot, who applauded the 
MNR government's opposition to "Communist imperialism" and the willingness on the part of the United 
States "to sink our differences and to cooperate with regimes pursuing a different course from ours to 
achieve common goals."79
CONCLUSION 
President Eisenhower arrived in Washington determined to prevent the spread of communism 
throughout Latin America. His commitment was based more on belief than on factual information. The 
president and his advisers did not have the information necessary to postulate a persuasive argument that 
communism in Latin America was becoming a serious threat. But they did not need such information.  For 
them, a government's willingness to have a few communists in its cabinet, maintain relationships with 
communist labor leaders, nationalize foreign companies, and implement agricultural reforms, along with its 
unwillingness to recognize that the communists were becoming a noteworthy force, meant that such a 
government risked being usurped by communists. The communist takeover of China's government in 1949, 
convinced the Eisenhower administration that these developments could not be taken lightly. More 
specifically, it persuaded the Eisenhower administration that these actions exhibited Moscow's determination 
to install a communist regime and that if Washington hoped to thwart such an attempt it would have to 
move swiftly. 
The Eisenhower administration relied on the China analogy to characterize the nature of the problem 
encountered by the United States in Guatemala under Jacobo Arbenz and in Bolivia under Victor Paz 
Estenssoro. The new administration believed that both Latin American leaders had been backed by the 
communists under the agreement that when in power they would work together to alter the economic and 
social structures of their respective countries. Washington was uncomfortable with the arrangement, but was 
willing to tolerate it so long as the Latin American leaders understood that when they assumed the presidency 
they would have to break the agreement with the communists and move against them. An unwillingness on the 
part of the Latin American leaders to acknowledge the threat posed by the communists, and to act against 
them, was interpreted by the Eisenhower administration to mean either that the government was dominated 
by communists or that it was soft on communism. Either case left Washington with one option: to try to 
topple the Latin American government before the communists took over. 
Any Latin American government that failed to comprehend Washington's strong attachment to the 
China analogy risked being deposed. In Bolivia, Paz Estenssoro understood this simple fact; in Guatemala. 
Arbenz did not. Paz Estenssoro and Andrade well remembered the effect that Washington's belief that Bolivia 
was being ruled by leaders who were pro-Axis had on the Villarroel government's ability to rule in the mid-
1940s. Both Bolivian leaders were determined not to make the same mistake twice. From the moment they 
regained power, they went out of their way to ensure that the Eisenhower administration would not perceive 
the new Bolivian government as being either dependent on the communists or soft on communism. The 
Arbenz government, on the other hand, without an insider in Washington and the benefit of a costly 
experience, did not take seriously Washington's warning that Guatemala was being threatened by the 
communists.   And for this error, it paid dearly. 
Foreign policy makers are prisoners of the past. Their decisions are anchored to lessons inferred from 
previous occurrences. To say that they are captives of past events is not to assert that they cannot break the 
chain that ties them. Although cracking the chain is not easy, particularly if the analogy came into being as 
the result of a costly experience, it may be, in some instances, the only way to avoid conflict. The avoidance 
of conflict demands an understanding of how the party contemplating the use of force reasons. It also 
demands an understanding of the analogy that dominates the would-be aggressor's thinking process, a 
willingness to take the analogy seriously, and a determination to prove that the analogy is inapplicable to the 
situation at hand. 
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